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Forensic science is currently undergoing a transformation and expansion to include modern types of
evidence, such as evidence generated by digital investigations. This development is said to raise a series
of challenges, both in operational and conceptual dimensions. This paper reviews and discusses a series
of convoluted conceptual hurdles that are encountered in connection with the use of digital evidence as
part of evidence and proof processes at trial, in contradistinction to investigative uses of such types of
evidence. As a recent example raising such hurdles, we analyse and discuss assertions and proposals
made in the article “Digital Evidence Certainty Descriptors (DECDs)” by Graeme Horsman (32 Forensic
Science International: Digital Investigation (2020) 200896).
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In an editorial published a few years ago, Professor James Curran
inquired about the intriguing question of why there is so much
resistance against statistics in forensic science [25]. By statistics,
Professor Curran did not primarily mean “the basic statistics
requirement for any science degree” [25, p. 252]. He meant the
principles and the logic of ‘‘evidence interpretation’’ [25, p. 252],
that is the reasonable reasoning in the face of uncertainty. One
would have hoped that mindsets averse to statistics improved over
the last decade, not least because of specialist fora such as the tri-
ennal International Conference on Forensic Inference and Statistics
(ICFIS, http://www.law.lu.se/#!ICFIS2020) and evaluative directives
published by expert groups [80], professional associations [4], sci-
entific committees [3] and collaborations between lawyers and
statisticians from recognised institutions [e.g., 77]. To be fair, Pro-
fessor Curran probably did not refer to forensic science as a whole,
because this may have included himself. Rather, he referred to
some quarters within forensic science that are reluctant to accept
argumentative implications which derive from formal methods of
reasoning, andwhich are applicable to forensic evidence evaluation
(see also [10] for a further example). As we will exemplify andermann).
ier B.V. This is an open access artidiscuss throughout this paper, such quarters are also encountered
in connection with the ongoing transformation and expansion of
forensic science1 to include modern types of evidence, such as
evidence generated by digital investigations. A specific source of
concern is the use of digital evidence in evidence and proof pro-
cesses at trial, in contradistinction to the use of such evidence in
investigative proceedings, both of which involve a series of con-
voluted conceptual hurdles. The aim of this paper is to raise and
discuss several of these hurdles, and to emphasise the timely
relevant nature of this topic by reference to assertions and pro-
posals made in recent scientific literature.
Specifically, we refer to a paper by Graeme Horsman [45] in
which the author addresses a series of topics that we identify as
conceptual hurdles in digital forensic science. In that paper [45]
Horsman discusses means by which digital forensic experts may
deal with uncertainty encountered in the course of evaluating and
reporting results of digital evidence examinations. While we
recognise this as a valuable aspiration, we disagree with several of
the author’s assertions and conclusions. Further, as we will show
throughout this paper, the author’s account of state of the art
concepts and principles of forensic interpretation is, on many1 Evidence of the transformation of forensic science is the fact that, as of 2020,
the former journal ‘Digital Investigation’ is continued as ‘Forensic Science Inter-
national: Digital Investigation’ [19].
cle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
A. Biedermann, K.N. Kotsoglou / Forensic Science International: Synergy 2 (2020) 262e274 263occasions, wide of the mark. The concern we share is that leaving
the author’s account uncommented would mean to deprive the
field from a balanced presentation of the properties of standard
ways to cope with uncertainty, despite the fact that many of the
points we shall make have been made before and that there is
ample literature available on the topic. Thus, in a broader
perspective, we also aim at inquiring about the reasons for the
conceptual obstacles that we identify in digital forensic science, and
in mindsets of commentators in this field. We will do so by looking
beyond disciplinary borders, that is by uncovering parallels to
controversies observable in scientific areas outside forensic science.
By way of an introductory example, Horsman writes that the
efforts to quantify uncertainty, that is the hallmark of forensic
science development since the second half of the last century,
should be discontinued in the field of digital evidence. “It is
argued”, hewrites, “that attempts to quantify uncertainty should be
abandoned” [45, p. 1].2 Further, he asserts that “at present there are
no available satisfactory methods for achieving this [the quantifi-
cation of uncertainty]”, and “suggests that attaining such methods
may not actually be possible” [p. 1]. As we will show, these state-
ments are at oddswithwhat has been achieved in a variety of fields,
including forensic science, concerned with the development and
implementation of formal approaches to dealing with uncertainty.
The purpose of the present paper is to critically examine and
discuss these statements and others made by Horsman at various
instances throughout his article. We will show that his approach
towards formal methods of reasoning misconstrues the fact that
human beings may have conceptual limitations (to enact formal
reasoning methods) as a deficiency of the methods themselves. We
will also show that Horsman’s proposal for a scale of “certainty
descriptors” [p. 1] represents an instance of what, historically, is
known as a collection of posterior-statements; to wit, direct
statements (opinions) on propositions,3 based on particular evi-
dence. For various reasons, both inferential and procedural in na-
ture, this way of structuring propositions is unsuitable for forensic
scientists4 operating at advanced stages of the legal process, in
particular during evaluative reporting,5 and is incompatible with
(domestic) legal provisions.
Within a broader perspective, Horsman’s diagnosis that the field
of digital forensic science ‘‘diverges from other forensic-sub disci-
plines [sic]’’ [p. 2] and, in effect, digital evidence practitioners do
not need to quantify their uncertainty, can be seen as a form of
intellectual exceptionalism. This specific claim of exceptionalism and
its potential drawbacksmerit attention.6 Firstly, because Horsman’s
paper as such does not convey a reliance on extensive research
regarding key topics, such as probability. Secondly, the paper’s
understanding of the structure of legal orders, especially the ar-
chitecture of what we would call e at the cost of oversimplification
e the adversarial criminal process, is problematic. The paper’s basic
claim, i.e. the alleged need to eliminate subjectivity, is questionable
in its assumptions and proposed methodology as a means for2 From now on, for shortness of notation, all direct quotes from Horsman’s paper
[45] are given without specific reference, only with page numbers.
3 Broadly speaking, propositions are statements about possible states of the
world (or, events therein). Propositions are either true or false and can be affirmed
or denied (see also [80, p. 24]).
4 Throughout this paper, the terms (forensic) scientist, examiner and expert are
coarsely treated as synonyms.
5 As we will explain in later sections of this paper, the requirements for evalu-
ative reporting should to be distinguished from those of investigative reporting.
6 We note, however, that exceptionalism also manifests itself in forensic science
at large. Lander [58], for example, critically exposes exceptionalism in the ANZFSS
council statement on the President’s Council Of Advisors On Science And Tech-
nology Report [70]. For further examples in scientific literature, see Section 2.1, in
particular footnote 10.resolving practical problems in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. It merely adds to the uncertainty.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by providing
a brief overview of the main critiques that Horsman formulates
against quantitative approaches to measuring uncertainty. These
critiques will be analysed and discussed in a series of subsections
by exposing the feasibility, the nature and the purpose of the
standard (scientific) measure of uncertainty, i.e. probability. In turn,
Section 3 exposes the importance of distinguishing between
investigative and evaluative modes of thinking and the implica-
tions of this distinction on the logical form of statements provided
forensic examiners. Our argument here will be that different
thinking-styles or, more formally, different methods of inference,
require different forms of behaviour and actions, and different
forms of expression of opinion. Section 4 examines Horsman’s non-
quantitative proposal for capturing uncertainty, called Digital Evi-
dence Certainty Descriptors (DECDs). We will show that the sug-
gested DECDs framework replicates the design of conclusion-scales
previously proposed in other forensic branches and, thus, is inev-
itably affected by the shortcomings of these concepts exposed in
existing literature. We will show that the descriptive nature of
DECDs make them unsuitable by design for interpretation at the
evaluative stage because, by definition, interpretation is an
analytical process that goes beyond mere description. Section 5
provides a summary of the principal discussion points and em-
beds these within a wider perspective. This section will argue that
the successful extension of forensic science to include digital evi-
dence hinges upon the field’s proper understanding of foundational
aspects regarding the measurement of uncertainty (using proba-
bility) and the field’s commitment to the precepts of evaluative
reporting in forensic science.2. On the existence and feasibility of a (scientific) measure of
uncertainty: the nature and assignment of probability
2.1. Horsman’s approach at a glance
The most visible thread in Horsman’s paper is his critique of
formal methods of reasoning. As is illustrated by the following
quotes, Horsman questions both the applicability of formal
methods of reasoning in the context of digital evidence, as well as
their existence:
 In his conclusions, he briefly mentions ‘‘mathematical methods
for quantifying evidence’’7 [p. 8], but then asserts that there is
‘‘an absence of such methods’’ [p. 8]. This claim is demonstrably
false, as we will show below.
 Elsewhere, Horsman seems to acknowledge the existence of
formal methods of reasoning and their use in other branches of
forensic science, but questions the applicability of these
methods in digital forensic science. For example, on page 2, he
writes that ‘‘many other traditional forensic science disciplines
are encouraged to describe the weight of their evidence in some
form of quantifiable measurement/expression’’, but that ‘‘at
present, there are (…) no satisfactory ways to achieve this’’ in
digital forensic science.87 As an aside, note that this is improper wording. What is being quantified is not
the ‘evidence’, but the weight of evidence.
8 Note also that the primary role of formal methods of reasoning is not to merely
describe e as Horsman suggests e the value of evidence, but to help elicit, assign
and assert it. Stated otherwise, interpretation is analytical, not descriptive. See
further discussion of this in Section 4.
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methods of reasoning cannot be enacted in digital forensic science.
He makes occasional reference to other known sceptics, such as
Lund and Iyer [66]. However, this is ineffective as an argument
because key claims of the latter have been refuted.9 Though the
author rightly observes, factually, that formal methods tend not to
be used in digital forensic science (‘‘this is rarely done in DF’’ [p. 2]),
he also presents the stronger claim that his ‘‘work suggests that
attaining such methods may not actually be possible due to the
intricacies of digital data and the difficulties involved with the fine-
grained interpretation of events’’ [p. 1]. This amounts to turning
down normative requirements and the demand for a coherent
framework which holds various practices together [15]. The argu-
ment here seems to be that the nature of digital forensic science is
inherently different from that of other forensic fields, and hence
excludes it from the application of formal methods of reasoning.
The following assertion represents a further instance of what we
call here exceptionalism: ‘‘It is proposed that achieving a scientific
mechanism for quantifying digital evidence may not actually be
feasible due to the nature of digital evidence and investigations of
this type (…)’’ [45, p. 3].
Horsman presents these assertions as though it were clear what
exactly it is in the ‘‘nature’’ [p. 3] of digital forensic evidence/science
that makes this field unsuitable for the application of formal
methods of reasoning, thus leaving his claim essentially unsup-
ported.10 The author may object to this point by arguing that his
article invokes the unavailability of (hard) data as a reason for the
impossibility of using formal methods of reasoning (‘‘the lack of
past case recording for statistical and learning purposes’’, ‘‘lack of
any predefined statistical data’’ [p. 3e4]). This, however, would be
an unfruitful defence because we would then need to presuppose
that numerical input is a necessary requirement for formal
methods of reasoningewhich, clearly, is not the case [e.g., [11] (see
also Section 2.3).
Horsman also raises the concern of subjectivity in relation with
probability (‘‘The use of subjectivity in determining the weight of
evidencewill naturally create a level of uncertainty, but this is often
a requirement for probabilistic methods.’’ [p. 3]), but abstains from
explaining what exactly subjectivity means and does not mean in
this context.11 Instead, Horsman aggregates both formal (i.e.,
probabilistic or quantitative) methods of reasoning and the collo-
quial use of the term subjectivity in a single category along with
terms such as ‘misleading’ and ‘arbitrary’. This is illustrated by the
following quotes:
 ‘‘However, any attempts to shoe-horn in such methodologies to
DF where their application may not actually be feasible may be
of greater detriment to this field, and provide an artificial
ranking of evidence which may be misleading.’’ [p. 3]9 See e.g. Aitken et al. [1] (with reference to earlier works by I.J. Good in the
1950s) on an argument for the inevitability of the likelihood ratio for the assess-
ment of uncertainty inherent in evidence evaluation, and [43] for a rebuttal from a
range of experts in forensic interpretation.
10 Unsupported claims of disciplinal distinctiveness are recurrently raised in many
areas of forensic science. For an example of the claim that probability is not
applicable in the area of forensic pattern analyses, see [51, 52] and related com-
ments in [10, 12].
11 The expression ‘‘create a level of uncertainty’’ [p. 3] begs the question (and
causes confusion) about the ‘‘uncertainty’’ about what and by whom. It would
seem, from further quotes on the same page, that the author refers to the uncer-
tainty on the part of the expert about the truth of a proposition or explanation
(technically, a posterior probability). This reveals a difficulty in understanding
forensic inference and the expert’s role. We will come back to this in the last
paragraph of Section 2.6, insisting on the importance of clarity of, and agreement
on, language. ‘‘(…) any weighting which is assigned by the practitioner which
is derived purely from their own personal views is arbitrary, as
previously stated, and is dangerous in terms of how a court may
value such descriptions of evidence.’’ [p. 4]
 ‘‘A lack of any predefined statistical data regarding the likeli-
hood of Action A or B being responsible when both remain
possible means that quantify [sic] the likelihood of each is a
challenge. The problem is that any assignment of likelihood to
either Action to be responsible is arguably arbitrary and there-
fore meaningless and unreliable. Arguably, in this case it may be
misleading to attempt to quantify the apparent uncertainty
regarding which Action is responsible.’’ [p. 4]
 ‘‘(…) the inconsistent and subjective weighting of evidence.’’ [p.
8]
These are stark assertions, but as we will show below, they
misrepresent the meaning of subjective or personal probability and
its role as part of formal methods of reasoning. This is a hindrance
for an informed discourse on the topic and amounts to an unsub-
stantiated reproach against formal (i.e., probabilistic) methods of
reasoning. This calls for a clarification.2.2. Uncertainty and probability
It is helpful to start our discussion with a clear statement of the
notion of uncertainty. Although this may seem unnecessary,
because the term is almost ubiquitously used in everyday language,
insisting on two related but distinct components to the term un-
certainty will be beneficial for the understanding of subsequent
argument. First, in a nutshell, uncertainty means ‘‘the extent of our
own knowledge and ignorance’’ [30, p. xvi]. Note that the words
‘‘our own’’ are central here. That is, what may be uncertain for one
person may not be for another, because of differences in their
respective bodies of knowledge and background information (this
does not rule out that, sometimes, these may be coextensive for all
practical purposes). Second, uncertainty relates to an aspect of the
real world, although it is not e following the point made in the
previous sentence e a feature of the world that exists indepen-
dently of a human observer. In short, the focus is on ‘‘(…) your ([i.e.]
the reader of these words) uncertainty about the world” [30, p. ix].
So, uncertainty is all about ‘‘being uncertain about something’’ [30,
p. xv, emphasis added] of the present, past or future. By now, the
attentive reader should have noticed a first key point: dealing with
and, in particular, measuring uncertainty amounts to coping with a
human condition; i.e., strength of belief in the truth or otherwise of
a proposition of interest. Hence, it is little surprising that the pro-
cess of dealing with uncertainty involves personalistic traits. One
may wonder, thus, why there is so much discomfort among sci-
entists against the personalistic nature of the measure of uncer-
tainty. Denying this nature essentially amounts to denying reality.
We discuss possible reasons for this reaction below.
The questions now are: How can one measure something, such
as uncertainty, which is inherently personal? How can yours, ours,
anybody’s uncertainty be measured? Note that the scientific
approach to these questions places an emphasis on measurement,
because ‘‘[…] it is by measuring things that we know them.’’ [61, p.
13]. The question of how to measure your12 uncertainty is widely
covered in literature, which is why wewill only mention a few core
principles here, and give references in which more detailed pre-
sentations can be found. First and foremost, probability is not a12 In what follows, only ‘your uncertainty’ will be used for shortness of notation
and as a way to make the exposition more appealing to the reader.
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repeatable here. There is only a single, non-replicable event.14
Second, measuring uncertainty is an entirely general question
that does not depend on the area of application, be it (digital)
forensic or one pertaining to an aspect of daily life, i.e. formal or
informal. Third, measuring uncertainty is not fundamentally
different from measuring in other areas of science: measurements
are made by reference to a standard.15 The notion of ‘standard’,
though, warrants a comment. As has been pointed out in philo-
sophical literature, extreme vagueness is mainly a problem of
measurement [6, p. 190e192], leading each individual to deploy his
or her own understanding by reference to his or her own inner
sensations. To measure, one needs a reference (point) to serve as a
standard (e.g., of proof) or, alternatively, a so-called canonical
instance (or, sample). Coherence and rationality demand that a fail-
safe standard of measurement is to be applied in every instant case.
It is deeply undesirable and deleterious especially for the coherence
of a legal system to tolerate a practice wherein different expert
witnesses assess and articulate uncertainty in radically different
ways. For, ultimately, we would not apply methodological rules in
order to structure and measure personal beliefs, and quantify un-
certainty; on the contrary, we would end up using the respective
inner sensation in order to fix the supposed measurement of un-
certainty. Whereas we should let the standards of rationality
determine the measuring instrument, the opposite is the case in
Horsman’s article. His approach leads inexorably to the situation
where the process of capturing uncertainty is treated like a flexible
mass, rather than by reference to a canonical instance. What is
more, Horsman’s approach dispenses with measurement alto-
gether by resorting to mere description, which is insufficient for
dealing with uncertainty.16
Turning now to the measurement of uncertainty using proba-
bility, we shall again keep a concise account. One among several
ways to conceptualise probability is to say that your probability for
an event that is uncertain for you is m=n if, for you, the uncertainty
is judged to be the same as when drawing a ball at random from a
bag that contains n balls, of which m are black, and that the single
ball withdrawn turns out to be black [e.g., 62].17 There must be an
urnwith a proportion of black balls (different from zero and one) so
that the probability of drawing a black ball is such that the uncer-
tainty is, for you, judged to be the same as that which, for you,
endows the event of interest. Probability, thus, our measure of
uncertainty, is a number between zero and one.
In relation to this, a few comments are in order. First and fore-
most, the above conceptualisation is about the feasibility in13 For reasons explained in [9, 13], relative frequency is not directly amenable to
measuring uncertainty, though may inform it.
14 The device is a general one and nothing prevents it from being applicable in
other contexts where events can be considered as instances of a series of like
events, and relative frequency data may be available. But, even in those cases,
relative frequency data does not define probability, it merely informs it [65, 75]. By
separating the definition from the evaluation of probability, belief-type probability
avoids the drawbacks of classic accounts that attempt to devise a single criterion
based on, for example, frequency or symmetry [40].
15 Note that there are other ways to arrive at probability as a measure of uncer-
tainty. One such other way, mentioned briefly later in Section 2.5, is based on
scoring rules and considering the assignment of a probability as a personal decision.
For a summary of different methods of establishing the rules of probability, see
Lindley [65, p. 74e75].
16 See Section 4.1 for further discussion on the difference between description and
analysis.
17 Note that only the draw of a single ball is to be contemplated, and the outcome
of this draw is determined by the proportion of black balls. In particular, there is no
repetition involved here (i.e., repeated drawing of balls) and no idea of a relative
frequency of coloured balls. Literally, ‘‘[a]fter its withdrawal, the urn and its con-
tents can go up in smoke for all that it matters.’’ [65, p. 36].principle of measuring uncertainty. It must not be confused with
the applicability of the measuring device. Applicability, which may
indeed not be easy, is a distinct matter in its own right. It may not
be easy for you to decide which proportion of black balls reflects
your uncertainty regarding the event you are contemplating. Yet,
this is of no detriment to the fact that, fundamentally, the
measuring device is simple and intuitively understandable. Second,
to be clear, the suggestion here is not that we ought to keep, or even
bring to court, a real (i.e., physical) bag or urn filled with balls to be
used for measuring our uncertainty about events of interest. The
device is a conceptual one, used merely to clarify precisely what we
mean by ‘‘being uncertain’’ [30, p. xv]. There are other such devices,
studied widely by psychologists.18 Third, only your uncertainty is of
importance: whether the actual truth-state of the uncertain events
is known or knowable by others, for example, has no bearing on
your uncertainty [30].
2.3. Relation to statistics
Attentive readers may have observed that, so far, we have not
yet mentioned the field of statistics. They may even wonder
whether the above conceptualisation is ignoring statistics (and data
analysis) by defining statements of personal belief as the overriding
mode of capturing uncertainty. The contrary is the case. The device
introduced above is merely providing the starting point for
explaining principal aspects, such as probabilities being given by
numbers in the range between zero and one. While, in its widest
sense, ‘‘statistics is essentially the study of uncertainty’’ [63, p. 294],
some tend to think of statistics as the field that applies whenever
there is data to be used for inference. That is, the coherent revision
of an initial probability (regarding an uncertain event of interest) in
the light of new data. This represents an entire field in its own right
[e.g., 2, 73] which is beyond the scope of the discussion here. The
current discourse is at a much more basic stage: the nature and
formal expression of uncertainty irrespective of whatever data there
may be to help appreciate it. More so, in some situations e often
times in forensic science e there may be no suitable data in the
instant case. Yet, at the end of the day, we remain with uncertainty
about the truth of a contested event. It is of interest then to
conceptualise uncertainty about this event in a defensible
manner.19 If we cannot do this, or we are unwilling to admit that
uncertainty measurement devices exist and can, in principle, be
enacted, any more sophisticated study of uncertainty (e.g. more
advanced statistical implementations and the use of specific data),
cannot even get off the ground. However, this is what Horsman’s
paper is advocating: it contests the existence and applicability of
quantitative measures of uncertainty (e.g.: ‘‘an absence of such
methods’’ [p. 8]). By doing so, it deters the field (of digital forensic
science) from apprehending these measures in a beneficial way.
We saw above that the measurement of uncertainty using
probability can be stated in simple terms. It can be conceptualised
in a clear and concise way that should be understandable for gen-
eral audiences, including ‘‘business executives, (…) politicians, as
well as scientists’’ [61, p. vii]. In short, for ‘‘(…) anyone who is
interested (…) and (…) prepared to take the trouble to follow a
reasoned argument’’ [61, p. vii]. But how, then, can it be that18 One such other device is the spinning of a wheel with coloured segments of
varying size. Here, the probability of the wheel stopping on a coloured segment
depends on the size of the segment, that can be adjusted, in analogy to the
adjustable proportion of coloured balls in a bag, so as to reflect one’s uncertainty.
See [78] for further discussion, and [50] for an application to probabilistic reasoning
for lawyers.
19 As an aside, this defies the false claim that a probability can only be assigned if
there are hard data.
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reviewed journals in this area, adopt probability-averse positions?
This is an intriguing question. While it may be one for sociological
research to investigate, it is stimulating to consider how statisti-
cians have reflected on this issue:
‘‘The truth of the matter is that people dislike simple problems:
they like to take refuge in complicated ones where the in-
adequacies of their procedures are difficult to challenge because
of the obscurity generated by complication. As has been said,
‘Practical decision-makers instinctively want to avoid the rather
awful clarity that surrounds a really simple decision’. The reply
to the accusation of guessing at probabilities (…) is simply that if
you can’t do simple problems, how can you do complicated
ones? To which a reply is: there are complicated problems that
people can solve without being able to solve the simple ones
that underlie them e for example, riding a bicycle. Is decision-
making like riding a bicycle? I think not. People ride bicycles
by repeated practice until, one day, it comes to them; they can
do it, they never forget, and they don’t know how they do it.
None of these notions easily carry over to decision-making.’’20
[61, p. 65]
A further way in which probability scepticism in (digital)
forensic science may be understood is to see it as a result of
abstaining from looking beyond disciplinary borders. This prevents
one from understanding that the nature of, and the key to the
conceptual problems faced by forensic scientists do not lie in
forensic science itself, or in (digital) forensic science exception-
alism. Instead, the ability to cope with these problems hinges on
our capacity to absorb the results of developments in the areas of
philosophy of science, mathematics, statistics and the broader
interdisciplinary research fields of decision science. As an example,
it is interesting to note that even among statisticians it is consid-
ered a fundamental challenge to properly conceive of a starting
point in their field [53]. Thus, for forensic scientists trying to
incorporate the same fundamental insights may be even more
demanding. The seriousness of this challenge should be clear. We
doubt that it makes sense for (digital forensic) scientists to attempt
to conceive their own ‘theory’ for reasoning under uncertainty.
Similarly, forensic biologists would not be well advised to do
without the advances of modern genetics, for this would imply the
rejection of current DNA profiling technology. History of science
unmistakably issues the warning that scientists who follow the
King of Hearts’ advice and ‘‘begin at the beginning’’ by setting their
own first principles inexorably run into difficulties. They will not
benefit from the level of sophistication in their field and be hard
pressed to do any meaningful work [44]. Yet this currently appears
to happen in some parts of digital forensic science.2.4. Misconceived subjective probabilism and spurious objectivism
Horsman’s ‘‘work examines the issues surrounding the quanti-
fication of DF examination results’’ [p. 2]. His key assertion is that
pressing too much on implementing a quantitative approach, i.e.
more than he thinks is actually feasible, is counter-productive: this
‘‘(…) may be of greater detriment to this field, and provide an
artificial ranking of evidence which may be misleading’’ [p. 3]. In
the same vein, Horsman describes the expression of (subjective)
probabilities (‘‘assigned probabilities based on experience and20 Note that even though this quote refers to decision-making, it is suitable for the
current discussion of uncertainty measurement using probability because proba-
bility assignment is an integral part of coherent decision analysis.subjective judgement’’ [p. 1]), that is the ‘‘inconsistent and sub-
jective weighting of evidence’’ [p. 8], as subject to criticism, indeed
inferior to ‘‘(…) objective measures [which] are considered more
favourable’’ [p. 1]. He asserts that the term subjective (in the sense
of ‘‘personal views’’ [p. 4]) means or implies being artificial,
misleading, arbitrary, meaningless, unreliable or even dangerous.
Note that Horsman raises all of the latter words at various instances
throughout his paper, either individually or in combination; see
either the quotes given above as well as the following two excerpts:
‘‘any assignment of likelihood (…) is arguably arbitrary and there-
foremeaningless and unreliable’’ [p. 4] and ‘‘anyweightingwhich is
assigned by the practitioner which is derived purely from their own
personal views is arbitrary (…) and is dangerous in terms of how a
court may value such descriptions of evidence’’ [p. 4].
These are severe words against a single notion. But, as it stands,
this account of subjective (personalistic) assessments (i.e., proba-
bilities) does not properly represent what personal probability is
about. Again, the point has been made repeatedly in literature and
current recommendations, but the fact that it continues to be
misstated warrants a brief recapitulation of a few key points.
Horsman’s perspective is predicated on the assumption that sub-
jectivism is tantamount to deliberate guesswork, elsewhere called
‘‘unconstrained subjectivism’’ [17, p. 478, emphasis as in original].
This, however, is not how subjective probabilists who are serious
about their scholarship understand and advocate the notion of
subjective (i.e., personal) assessments (of probability). First and
foremost, they do not equate subjectivism with arbitrariness: the
liberal21 nature of probability does not mean that one should feel
free to assert any number, without justification. What is of interest
is not any probability assignment, but a justified probability
assignment.22 Clearly, the idea here is that ‘‘[w]e strive tomake (…)
judgments as dispassionate, reflective and wise as possible (…)’’
[27, p. 144]. We are asking for ‘‘[r]reasonable personal probabilities’’
[41, p. 1504], admitting to the reality that ‘‘[i]f we cannot require
everybody sharing the same likelihoods, we can require everybody
having justified likelihoods’’ [41, p. 1506, emphasis as in original]. Of
course, this does not prevent some forensic scientists from
providing questionable forensic testimony, e.g. in terms of cate-
gorical conclusions, or even sheer denial of the potential of error,
but this does not invalidate the concept of personal probability e it
ignores it. The ENFSI Guideline, for example, clearly states that
probabilities ought to be viewed as ‘‘conditioned on the informa-
tion available to the individual who makes a probability assign-
ment’’ [80, p. 23]. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he basis for these assignments shall
be documented on the case file’’ [80, p. 15], thus conforming to the
requirement of justification as stipulated above. Specifically, the
ENFSI Guideline states:
‘‘personal probability assignment is not arbitrary or speculative,
but is based on a body of knowledge that should be available for
auditing and disclosure. The forensic practitioner should not
mislead the recipient of expert information as to the basis of the
personal assignment, and the extent to which the assignment is
supported by scientific research.’’ [80, p. 16, emphasis added]
Specifically, it is required that any assignment, wherever
possible, is based on data, that is ‘‘the technical and empirical
knowledge associated with a given trace type’’ [80, p. 19]:21 Probability is a liberal concept in the sense that it involves rather few con-
straints, such as coherence.
22 See [17] on the notion of justified subjectivism, and [13] for a detailed discus-
sion of common misconceptions about probability.
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publications, databases or internal reports or, in addition to or in
the absence of the above, be part of the expert knowledge built
upon experiments conducted under controlled conditions
(including case-specific experiments), training and experience.’’
[80, p. 19]
Note that there is a hierarchy stipulated here. Scientists cannot
use a vague reference to training and experience (mentioned last)
as a substitute to hard-wired scientific publications (mentioned
first). To some extent, it is surprising that all of this needs to be
stated so forcefully. In an ideal world, one would expect forensic
scientists to care about the reasonableness and robustness of their
statements, not least because their assertions expose them directly
to scrutiny by their peers.23 Conversely, it also seems to go without
saying that there is no suggestion, especially not in the ENFSI
Guideline, that scientists ought to make assessments at any price,
i.e. when they feel that a defensible assessment cannot be given.
Thus, Horsman’s discourse about there being ‘‘attempts to shoe-
horn in such methodologies in DF investigation’’ [p. 3] is alien to
the principles and intentions of forensic evaluation and evaluative
reporting.
We should also insist that criminal adjudication in England and
Wales e i.e. the main subsysteme defines the activities of auxiliary
forces (such as forensic science) by specifying aspects such as the
expert’s duty to the court (see The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015,
hereafter: CrimPR, Rule 19), the way that experts will deliver their
scientific input (i.e. not in their accustomed laboratory environ-
ment, but in a court room where people wear wigs and robes,
CrimPR, Rule 19.3) and, more importantly, the structure and con-
tent of the expert’s report (CrimPR, Rule 19.4). Experts will do what
the court andmethodological principles salient in scientific enquiry
and adapted to practical purposes ask them to do: address the
probability of the findings given the propositions and relevant
background information, and remain silent on the probability of the
propositions given the findings and background information.
Opining, let alone deciding on questions of justice is not required or
indeed permitted for forensic experts. Hence, Horseman’s language
involving terms such as ‘‘factually prove a hypothesis’’, ‘‘conclusive
fact’’, ‘‘100% proof’’ [p. 7] is unsuitable in principle for forensic
scientists.
By dismissing the idea of quantification as a whole, and by
advocating an exclusively qualitative (i.e., verbalistic) framework24
as an alternative, Horsman takes an extreme position. His reaction
suggests that there is only either a fully quantitative mode of
operation, or an entirely non-quantitative one. However, this is not
the case. Probability is a flexible framework that can be applied at
various levels of detail, invoking notions such as qualitative prob-
abilistic reasoning [e.g., 79], orders of magnitude and sensitivity
analyses [e.g., 11].25 And yet, a more radical reply to the aversion to
quantification can be given. That is, rather than defending numbers
ewhich is the position taken here e one could invoke the position
according to which, numbers are not the primary objective, but
coherence [69, p. 168]. Note, however, that this is different from
Horsman’s position that seeks to keep out of digital forensic evi-
dence, not only arithmetics, but the framework (of probability) as a23 See Section 2.5 for an understanding of probability assignment as a decision
that can help reinforce the idea that scientists take responsibility for their
assessments.
24 See Section 4 on further details about this framework.
25 Note that the ENFSI Guideline specifically mentions sensitivity analysis as a
device for use by forensic examiners (’‘forensic practitioners should consider
exploring the sensitivity of the likelihood ratio to different probabilities’’ [80, p. 9]).whole.
Critics of subjectivism commonly invoke objectivism as the
obvious solution, so does Horsman (‘‘concise representations (…)
that a practitioner can objectively describe’’ [p. 6], ‘‘objective
measures are consideredmore favourable’’ [p.1]). This is predicated
on the assumption that it is clear what objectivismmeans, let alone
it were feasible. The dualism that lingers here is that if subjectivism
is intrinsically inadequate, then its opposite, objectivism, must
necessarily be good. However, the contrary is the case: no choice of
a framework, method or procedure can be made without resort to
at least some personal judgment [9,13]. Though widely ignored,
this point has as abundantly been made, for example, by forensic
scientists [34], statisticians [8,64], legal theorists [55] and philos-
ophers of science [46].
A scientist’s assessment thus is inevitably personalistic. It relies
on a body of knowledge and data which is specific to that scientist.
By highlighting the necessarily subjective nature of their assess-
ments, and by redirecting their efforts to clarifying the extent to
which these assessments are, using the words of the ENFSI
Guideline, ‘‘supported by scientific research’’ [80, p. 16], scientists
can demonstrate that they take responsibility for their assessments
and take the burden of justification seriously. Being prepared to
expose the credentials of their assertions, to the best of their
knowledge, scientists could become counter-examples for Lad’s
observation that ‘‘[t]he modern conception of scientific method as
an objective and valueefree learning procedure is the source of the
distrust and disrespect shown to science by many people today’’
[57, p. 441].
2.5. The inevitability of probability and probability as a decision
By sidestepping probability and proposing his own ‘‘language
framework which defines the terms which should be used to
describe a practitioner’s level of certainty in the evidence/digital
content’’ [p. 6],26 Horsman makes a problematic suggestion. The
proper way to capture uncertainty is, as we understand Horsman’s
proposal, an activity that is unconstrained by formal requirements.
That is, probability is just as good as any other notion, however
intuitive, and that one may endorse it or not, comparable to a
matter of personal taste. However, this view misconceives the na-
ture of probability as a measure of uncertainty. Probability is all
about ensuring (logical) coherence, hence it is neither arbitrary, nor
could it be easily ignorede on pain of falling into incoherence. This
is why it has been argued that ‘‘[o]ne cannot sit down and think up
apparently reasonable rules (…) because one is not free to engage
in the intellectual exercise of law creation. The laws are forced upon
you. It is a case of the inevitability of probability. The laws ensure
that several statements of uncertainty cohere.’’ [61, p. 37].
To be clear, the suggestion at this juncture is not that probability
theory ought to be taught in the courtroom. The discussion here is
about the way in which forensic scientists should make up their
mind when dealing with uncertainty and assigning a value to their
findings e prior to proceeding with evaluative reporting.27 The
modest expectation is that this ought to be done in a reasonable
way. Reasonableness, in this context, means conformity with
reasonable rules of reasoning, i.e. probability.
Yet another way to understand the inevitability of probability is
to recognise that, fundamentally, assigning a probability amounts
to making a decision, for there is no probability unless one is being
assigned. The question then becomes how to decide on a probability
assignment in a way that is logically defensible, i.e. rational. What26 See Section 4 for further details on this framework.
27 See Section 3 for more on the notion of evaluative reporting.
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struct the problem of reporting on imperfect personal knowledge
in terms of probabilities, as a personal decision problem. There is a
whole body of specialised literature on this topic that arose from
the study of the question of how to assess, so-to-speak, the
‘goodness’ of probability assessors [e.g., 26]. These works, whose
details go beyond the scope of this paper, build upon decision
theory and operational devices such as scoring rules for supporting
the assignment of personal probabilities [e.g., 18, 60]. Though rarely
acknowledged in mainstream discussions about probability [65],28
it is relevant to emphasise here that the decisional perspective to
probability has been referred to as the single most meaningful
concept [29]. The relevance of mentioning this account for the
purposes of the discussion presented in this paper is twofold. First,
on a theoretical account, it provides a (further) method for
measuring uncertainty,29 thus adding to the scope of scientific ways
of measuring uncertainty e recall that Horsman denies the exis-
tence of such methods (‘‘given an absence of such methods’’ [p. 8]).
Second, on an operational account, the understanding that proba-
bility assignment amounts to, ultimately, a decision is valuable
because it reinforces the fact that the ‘problem’ of probability
assessment does not rely in the method, but in the limitations of
those who use it. Specifically, understanding probability as a deci-
sion most incisively reveals that probability assignment requires
one to take personal responsibility for one’s assertions. However
hard this simple reality is to accept, or to commit to, it is precisely
what recipients of expert information consider a desirable property
of evaluative reporting.2.6. Likelihood and probability
When being uncertain about an event of the present, past or
future, we commonly express this uncertainty in terms of proba-
bility. As mentioned in Section 2.2, probability is the measure of an
individual’s degree of uncertainty; it is a state of mind, that is the
degree of belief that a person holds concerning selected proposi-
tions of interest [29]. Horsman consistently avoids expressing
himself in terms of the probability of an event of interest, especially
the probability of observing evidence given a particular proposi-
tion.30 The latter is the key notion underlying the probabilistic
measure of the value of evidence, known as the likelihood ratio [2].
Instead, Horsman uses expressions of the following kind, equating
uncertainty with likelihood: ‘‘unquantifiable uncertainty/likeli-
hood’’ [p. 3]; ‘‘one where Action B is not likely to be responsible for
Result A and one where Action B is likely to be responsible for
Result A’’ [p. 3]; ‘‘quantification of the likelihood of Action B’’ [p. 3];
‘‘likelihood of Action A or B being responsible’’ [p. 4]; ‘‘Whilst
potentially unlikely, it may not be possible to refute this action’’ [p.
4].
This raises the question of howmeaningful it is to avoid the term
probability (probable) by using likelihood (likely) instead. In sta-
tistical theory, a distinction is made between the terms likelihood
and probability [e.g. 65], but unfortunately this distinction is often
overseen or ignored in forensic science literature. At the same time,
explaining the difference between likelihood and probability may
be confusing when experience shows that in practice, especially
legal practice, the two terms are largely taken to be synonyms.28 See, however, [13, 14, 16] for a discussion of the relevance of these topics for
expert probability reporting in forensic science.
29 Another method, based on a standard, has been introduced previously in Sec-
tion 2.2.
30 See Section 3 on the difference between the probability of the findings given
the proposition, and the reverse, i.e. the probability of a proposition given evidence.Notwithstanding, we shall make the difference here because it al-
lows us to reveal a contradiction in Horsman’s framework and
assertions.
For what it is worth, the distinction between likelihood and
probability, in statistical terms, involves different targets. Techni-
cally speaking, likelihoods pertain to hypotheses, not evidence. One
speaks of likelihood of a proposition for a given (fixed) item of
evidence (or, in statistics, data). At the same time, the probability of
the evidence given a proposition is called a likelihood (but: a
likelihood of the proposition).31 This can be understood by
considering the notion of likelihood ratio, that is the ratio of two
probabilities of a given (fixed) item of evidence conditional on,
respectively, each of two competing propositions. In short, thus,
likelihood describes the probability of the evidence conditional on
different propositions. What this distinction shows us in the context
of Horsman’s paper is that when he expresses himself in terms of,
for example, the ‘‘likelihood of Action A or B’’ [p. 4] (where A and B
are propositions), then, in a technically strict reading, he refers to
probabilities of some evidence conditional on, respectively, prop-
ositions A and B. However, the probability of the evidence given a
proposition is an inferential target that he precisely seeks to avoid.
This renders his critique of probabilistic evidence evaluation
internally contradictory.
Thus, ultimately, it remains unclear which uncertainty, and
measure thereof, Horsman exactly refers to: that of the findings
(evidence), the competing propositions (i.e., explanatory accounts),
or both. While definitional intricacies of technical language may be
a reason for this vagueness, yet a deeper problem is a lack of clarity
regarding the purpose of his analyses and discussion. The next
section addresses this issue.
3. Clarity on the purpose: investigation versus evaluation
Besides conceptual shortcomings in assertions about methods
for the measurement of uncertainty exposed in the previous sec-
tion, Horsman’s paper involves confusion with regard to the
distinct role in which forensic scientists may operate. This
distinction has to do with investigation as compared to evaluation.
Horsman writes that his paper deals with ‘‘the interpretation and
presentation of results; the latter will be the focus here’’ [p. 1,
emphasis as in original].
This raises the question of how this topic can be meaningfully
tackled without acknowledging the foundational and vast works on
case assessment and interpretation (CAI) [24, 49]. Broadly speaking,
CAI sees investigation as being centred around questions such as
‘what happened?’ or ‘what (material) is this?‘. It may involve sci-
entists suggest explanations for observations, or even suggest a
ranking of competing explanations according to their relative
plausibility [48]. A suspect (or, more generally, a person of interest)
does not necessarily need to be available at this juncture. In
contrast to this, the evaluative stage is fundamentally different.
According to the ENFSI Guideline, evaluation of forensic findings
becomes necessary when there are two competing versions of a
contested event, typically brought up by adversarial parties at trial,
and when it is of interest to assess the value of the forensic findings
in helping to discriminate between these two competing accounts
[80]. Moreover, a person of interest is typically available at this
point and materials seized in relation with that person is the object
of forensic examinations. Most importantly, at the evaluative stage,
the proper role of forensic scientists is no longer to opine directly31 In specialised literature, notation such as [ðHjEÞ is sometimes used to denote
the likelihood of hypothesis H given evidence E, which is the same as the PrðEjHÞ,
the probability of E conditional on H (see, e.g., [2]).
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value of the findings, that is focusing on the probability of the
findings given a pair of competing propositions. Often, these
propositions map, though not necessarily so, on the propositions
brought forward by the parties in litigation. These propositions
must be taken as a given. Examiners should not lose sight of the fact
that their role is limited to providing assistance to others, i.e. the
triers of fact at a criminal court.
Horsman’s paper is, however, concerned with the investigative-
type issues rather than evaluative-type issues. He describes the role
of examiners as follows: ‘‘(…) the practitioner must determine if it
is possible to identify which actions may be responsible for the
evidential result’’ [p. 3]. Clearly, in the CAI framework, this can be
recognised as an instance of hypotheses generation. Horsman also
proposes a scheme to provide an appreciation of the extent to
which the various evidential settings involve uncertainty. In the
context of the CAI framework, this would amount to ranking the
various explanatory accounts in terms of their posterior probabil-
ities.32 But at this point, Horsman’s framework stops, suggesting
that an investigative opinion is all that can be given, and that it is
ready to be carried over to more advanced stages of evidence and
proof processes. But, this is not the case. Recall that in the context of
investigation, examiners may be allowed to opine on explanatory
accounts, so Horman’s generation and ranking of hypotheses may
be fine for exclusively investigative purposes.33 Notwithstanding, it
is unfit by design for evaluative purposes at trial because, as
explained above, the requirements at this latter stage of the legal
process are fundamentally different from those of investigation.
At this juncture, let us recall that the important difference lies in
the form of the inference that will address, in a logical, justifiable
way, the specific questions in a case. The starting point for CAI is:
what are the questions/issues? Then the expert has to group these
questions/issues into two categories and decide whether she has
the necessary knowledge, competence and licence to provide direct
answers to the questions and/or the necessary knowledge,
competence and licence to provide an evaluation of the weight of
evidence in favour of one of two (or more) competing propositions.
The two broad forms of question/issue and inference (investigative
and evaluative) may well overlap and within any one case. The
expert has to be acutely aware of the difference and the interplay.
Having clarified the different aims and, related to that, the
content, form and logical structure of examiners’ conclusions and
reports (i.e., opining on explanatory accounts in investigation vs.
focus on evidence given propositions in evaluation), it is now
possible to review Horsman’s account from a broader perspective,
to examine whether his aversion to the use of probability is well
grounded. In essence, what Horsman is arguing for is the sorting
out of viable accounts as to how digital forensic findings (evidence)
came into place. As noted above, established interpretative ac-
counts in forensic science, i.e. CAI, have never contested such an
activity for forensic examiners. Quite to the contrary, CAI has
explicitly reserved room for this, in the form of investigative opin-
ions. Most importantly, and this is the critical point, CAI has never
insisted on the fact that such investigative opinions must strictly
and systematically be structured in strictly probabilistic terms.34
Thus, when Horsman criticises probabilism in the context of32 It must be stressed that there are potentially severe limitations to investigative
opinions, not least of which is tunnel-vision.
33 It remains legitimate to ask, though, whether even in investigation examiners
should restrict their reporting to the findings only [e.g., 20], so as to leave inves-
tigative authorities form their own conclusions based on all elements on a case
including other, non-technical/scientific items of evidence.
34 Though it is possible, of course, to develop probabilistic accounts for investi-
gative purposes [e.g., 74].investigation, he essentially argues against a straw man. The
probabilism that Horsman addresses, in particular the concept of
probability of the evidence given the proposition, is e in terms of
CAI e part of evaluative procedures, not necessarily investigative
settings.
This confusion is unfortunate, essentially because an acknowl-
edgment of CAI literature should have clarified matters right away.
As an aside, this discussion reveals a deeper problem of current
forensic science research: the problem of disregarding fundamen-
tals. The difficulty here lies in balancing the use of concepts from
outside forensic science. Where this difficulty is avoided, resorting
to (digital) forensic science exceptionalism should come as no
surprise. The importance of attaching to fundamentals, especially
in forensic interpretation, has long been recognised [31]. Thus,
studying and acknowledging foundational literature, in particular
its key messages [e.g., 33],35 should help us avoid misconceptions
that can grow out of ad-hoc theorising. While a lack of appreciation
of foundational literature can also be a problem in other areas of
science [36], one would hope that forensic science should aim at
doing better, not least because its pretension is to serve the judi-
ciary and because scientists’ conclusions may adversely affect
innocent defendants or, alternatively deprive the victims of crime
the justice that they deserve.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose now that the analysis in
the present paper is wrong and that Horsman’s criticism indeed
targeted evaluative (rather than only investigative) reporting and
the impossibility to address questions regarding the probability of
the evidence given the proposition. More specifically, suppose that
even the most sophisticated digital forensic science expert could
not address, for whatever reason, the question of the probability of
the evidence given the propositions of interest in an instant case.
That would be a very useful finding. It wouldmean that the value of
the evidence could not be assessed,36 and hence the evidence
should be kept out of evaluative proceedings (at trial) altogether.
The reason for this is that such an item of evidence is simply un-
informative,37 and trying to adduce it would be a waste of time and
resources. Such an item has no (probative) value. It would provide
no assistance to anyone asked to decide which of the competing
propositions debated at trial is proven in view of the requisite legal
standard of proof e regardless of any use made in investigation.
This shows that solving an investigative problem is not tantamount
to solving an evaluative problem.4. Digital Evidence Certainty Descriptors (DECDs): the
numbers trap and the intricacies of qualitative abstractions
4.1. Fundamental design problems of DECDs
Horsman’s proposed solution to the alleged inexistence and
unfeasibility in principle of methods for quantifying uncertainty is a
range of verbal descriptors, seeking to convey the extent of (un)
certainty (‘‘the use of language as a way of expressing ‘certainty’
(…) and clarity in regards to what the language means when used’’
[p. 6]), called Digital Evidence Certainty Descriptors (DECDs):35 Among these key messages is the precept, advised against by Horsman, of
attaching to the probability of the evidence given the proposition: ‘‘(…) the single
most important advance has nothing to do with technology (…). It tells us the most
important lesson for the logic of evaluative forensic science: consider the probability
of the evidence, given the proposition.’’ [33, p. 159].
36 Note that the (probative) value of the evidence is a function of the probability of
the evidence given propositions [e.g., 1, 39].
37 The evidence is uninformative in such a case because there is no statement
about its probative value.
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to indicate apparent uncertainty but refrain and accept we
cannot yet quantify it. Rather than strive to numerically quantify
evidence weightings, it is proposed that a more viable option is
to harmonise the language practitioners use to express certainty
in their findings.’’ [p. 6]
The digital evidence certainty descriptors involve six qualifiers,
ranging from ‘‘conclusive fact’’ (‘‘proof in relation to a given sce-
nario’’ [p. 7]), various intermediate levels such as ‘‘conceivable’’
(‘‘the lowest form of certainty’’ [p. 7]), to ‘‘impossible’’ (‘‘events
which cannot possibly occur’’ [p. 7]). It is worth mentioning that
Horsman explains his scale by resorting to numerical expressions.
For example, the descriptor ‘‘conclusive fact’’, should apply when
‘‘we are looking at 100% proof’’ [p. 7]. But since DECDs involve or-
dinary words, trying to explain let alone define them raises a
problem on legal grounds. Courts in England andWales are at pains
to stress that it is a general principle of English law that ordinary
words are notions onwhich the fact-finders will decide based upon
their own experience of ordinary life. Experts should therefore
refrain from opining on their meaning, for they are almost by
definition non-experts on the meaning of ordinary words. Lord
Hughes in Golds makes a similar point when he highlighted the
principle of ‘‘leaving an ordinary word alone’’.38
The choice of the verbal terms in the DECDs scheme, their
number and definition shall not be discussed here. Recalling dis-
cussion presented in Section 2.4, it shall suffice to notice that this
range of descriptors represents an example for a personal (rather
than an objective) choice of framework. In what follows, the logical
structure of the proposed evidence certainty descriptors will be
examined, revealing a fundamental design problem.
As their name suggests, the proposed verbal descriptors
(DECDs) seek to qualify the (extent of) certainty, but the target of
this description is confusing. DECDs are supposed to concentrate on
the evidence (i.e., ‘‘conveying when uncertainty exists in a set of
digital findings’’ [p. 1]), yet the definition given in Table 1 (in
Ref. [45]) on page 7 is consistently framed as conclusions regarding
hypotheses (i.e., competing explanatory accounts): ‘‘proof in rela-
tion to a given scenario” [p. 7], ‘‘the proposed hypothesis is not
disproved’’ [p. 7], ‘‘conveying how reliable they deem any resulting
hypotheses from (…) digital investigations’’ [p. 8]. Hence, it is not
clear whether Horsman is qualifying uncertainty in relation to the
evidence given various competing propositions, or the uncertainty
affecting propositions given (i.e., in the light of) particular evidence.
Following arguments exposed in Section 3, only the former is
suitable for evaluation while the latter may be acceptable for
investigative purposes.
If the intended design of DECDs is to qualify the evidence and, at
the same time, suggest a conclusion about competing propositions
(or the discriminative capacity regarding competing propositions),
then DECDs warrant a further comment: the lack of an argumen-
tative basis for the claim of going directly from observations to
conclusions. The history of forensic science has seen numerous
attempts (ineffective on logical grounds) of designing conclusion
formats of the kind ‘if a is observed, conclude b’. For example, the
AFTE (Association of Firearm and Toolmark Examiners) theory of
identification stipulates that when there is ‘‘sufficient agreement’’
[23, p. 287] (i.e., a given type of observation is made), then this
‘‘enables opinions of common origin to be made’’ [id.] (i.e., a
statement regarding the truth or otherwise of a particular propo-
sition). For a critical discussion of attempts to design a similar38 Golds [2016] UKSC 61, para 37. See also Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854.conclusion scale in the area of forensic shoemark examinations, see
Ref. [21]. The fundamental problem with these suggestions is that
they oversee that support for a particular proposition, as provided
by evidence, is an inferential concept that requires one to observe,
on pain of falling into incoherence, certain logical principles: in
essence, these come down to assessments that take the form
‘probability of the evidence given the proposition’ [1]. There is no
known proper method of inference that justifies a procedure
whereby predefined qualifiers, to serve as conclusions to be re-
ported, are to be picked from a list consisting of various verbal
descriptions (i.e., definitions of qualifiers).
One may object to this critique by arguing that there is no
intention to endow DECDs with any formal inferential mechanism,
only with a purely descriptive purpose. After all, their name con-
tains the word ‘descriptor’, and throughout his paper, Horsman
widely uses the words ‘describing’ and ‘description’ (e.g., ‘‘DECD is
designed to ensure that the language practitioners use to describe
when uncertainty is present in an examination is consistent’’ [p. 6,
emphasis added]). However, if that is the case, this falls short of the
stated purpose. Recall that Horsman’s paper stated its purpose as
follows: ‘‘interpretation and presentation of results; the latter will be
the focus here’’ [p. 1, emphasis as in original]. The point we intend to
make here is that interpretation and description are different
topics. Conventionally, description has to do with capturing, by an
observer, perceivable aspects and properties of a descriptum, that is
the entity to which a description refers. Interpretation, in turn, is
different in the sense that it is not descriptive, but analytical, and
involves inference. As per definition, the target of interpretation,
that is the meaning of evidence, is not an inherent property that
could be captured in a descriptive sense. Arriving at an interpre-
tation through description, as is the pretence of DECDs, thus
amounts to a contradiction in terms. If one wishes to describe the
strength (or meaning) of evidence, one first needs to work it out,
which can only be achieved by interpretation, not description.
Pretending the contrary would amount to what Salmon has called
‘‘epistemological magic’’ [71, p. 66].
To be clear, interpretation seeks to work out the meaning of an
interpretans through inference, that is the use of a reasonable (i.e.,
coherent) method of reasoning. The logical structure of such
methods of reasoning relies on the formal method for dealing with
uncertainty whose existence and/or applicability Horsman ques-
tions (see quotes given in Section 2.1). In conclusion, thus, Hors-
man’s framework is neither analytical in an inferential sense, nor
interpretative, in the proper senses of these terms. It cannot be
because it abstains from the scientific method of dealing with un-
certainty, which is probability.
4.2. The eternal ‘could have/be’
The framework of DECDs contains several instances of the use of
language involving the expression ‘could have/be’:
 ‘‘Multiple actions could be responsible for same output.’’ [p. 3,
emphasis added]
 ‘‘Possible that this information could have been the result of a
number of actions such as part of a legitimatewebsite which has
been cached and deleted without a user ever visiting it or it
could have been sent to the device via spam emails which have
since been deleted.’’ [p. 7, emphasis added]
 ‘‘It may be ‘Conceivable’ that a suspect could have browsed the
apparent URL’’ [p. 7, first emphasis as in original, second emphasis
added]
The expression ‘could have/be’ is particularly unsuitable for use
by forensic scientists for a number of reasons and has, thus,
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rely on other authors in order to insist on the fact that none of our
arguments is fundamentally new.
First and foremost, the expression ‘could have/be’ induces sci-
entists to opine on the plausibility of propositions (i.e., the events
that ‘could have’ led to the findings) which, as exposed in Section 3,
is not appropriate for evaluative reporting.39 It has also been noted
that ‘‘[t]he phrases ‘‘consistent with’’ and ‘‘could have’’ appear still
widely used in the forensic science community because they lead to
a fairly easy life: no real interpretation is required, and often the
statements made are little more than statements of the obvious.
However, science is about understanding (…)’’ [35, p.10, emphasis as
in original].40 Further, it is difficult to keep track of how different
recipients of expert information align in their understanding of
expressions such as ‘could have’ (see e.g. [47, p. 82] for an example
involving the range between 1 in 3 and 1 in 3 million).
In combination, the above observations reveal a key insight:
avoiding quantitative expressions through the use of qualitative
verbal expressions will leave recipients of expert information
clueless about the strength of one’s message, to the point of being a
statement of the obvious.41 As such, the use of the expression ‘could
have/be’ in forensic science provides a textbook example of what in
literature in the philosophy of probability has long been recognised
as hollow expertise:
‘‘(…) the answers provided by the experts, when formulated in
words, tend to be rather elusive. Typically experts give evalua-
tions like: ‘‘It is almost certain, but not sure; indeed it might not
be the case.’’ and so on. They say and unsay in the one breath,
not to risk too much. The result is that it is never quite clear
what their answers mean. The expert tries to speak in such a
way as to secure himself that, whatever happens, one cannot tell
him that he was wrong. On the contrary, if questions are asked
in such a way as to obtain a probability value as an answer, the
ambiguity disappears.’’ [29, p. 8]
Clearly, forensic scientists should aim at a reporting language
that offers more than qualitative vagueness. The way out of the
impasse of qualitative wording, however, does not come effort-
lessly. It brings us back, as noted in the above quote, to the fun-
damentals of the scientific approach to uncertainty measurement,
which is probability.
A further way to understanding this argument is to ask: Why do
we need to hire an expert? The answer is that one resorts to experts
whenever one seeks an assessment for an issue that lies beyond
one’s area of expertise. Experts’ assessments can take many forms,
of course, with the lowest level of assessment often being regarded
as one coarsely referring to possibilities. However, we should ask
how useful a mere statement of possibility is. Suppose that all an
expert would be able to say is that it is possible to observe this
evidence if proposition A were true, but that is also possible to
observe the same evidence in the event that another proposition, B,
were true. To be clear, there are situations in which this is all that
can meaningfully be stated e i.e. a case in which the evidence
would have no probative value e but this should not be taken to
mean that reporting language in terms of mere possibilities should
set the bar. The truth is that it is by quantification that wemake our39 Not also that there is technical argument to show that direct assertions about
propositions are not amenable for logical combination, in particular in the context
of the joint assessment of multiple items of evidence (see [72] for a discussion).
40 While we agree generally with this comment that explanations are often
‘‘obvious’’, we acknowledge that there are situations in which an explanation is
quite technical and would not be obvious to the lay person.
41 With the exception noted in footnote 40.way through the world: at the end of the day, humans in their
professional activities as well as in other matters regarding their
daily lives must make decisions whose consequences depend on
uncertain states of nature, that is probability. This is not to say that
a probability needs to be framed in full quantitative terms (i.e.
numerically). An order of magnitude may be sufficient to be useful
[e.g., 28].42 Contrast this with an expression in terms of possibility
which means nothing more than a probability different from zero
or one.
To illustrate this point, suppose being told that you won the
lottery. This may be little helpful for you as your immediate ques-
tion will be ‘How much?’. Suppose further that the answer you
receive is something like ‘a lot’, ‘sufficientlymuch’, etc. At this point,
you may end up being annoyed and ask ‘How do you know what a
lotmeans for me? e Give me the number!’.43 This is also the reason
why scales for the value of evidence, e.g. as proposed in Ref. [68,80],
start from numbers and relate them to words, not the reverse
[7,42,67]. DECDs, in turn, start and end with words. This is not to
claim that well-recognised value of evidence scales [68,80] are a
panacea for reporting problems in forensic science: indeed, if there
is a number, or at least an order of magnitude, it becomes ques-
tionable whether there is any (added) value in couching this
expression in verbal terms for which no uniform understanding
across individuals can be assumed.
To summarise, let us clarify what exactly we argue for. We are
not arguing that in a rationality-driven world, everyone should
necessarily use probability in a fully numerical or computational
way. Often, targeting an advanced level of detail or consideration of
a densely related collection of variables will pose operational dif-
ficulties. Practical decisions are typically responsive to many vari-
ables, thus making computation come at the price of efficiency, or
even worse: analysis paralysis. We also make no prescriptive claim
of how exactly evaluative reporting should be formulated in prac-
tice (but see examples given in Ref. [80]). Our concern in this paper
is the forensic scientists’ mindset which we consider a necessary
preliminary to subsequent practical proceedings. Indeed, forensic
science has been referred to as a state of mind because ‘‘(…)
whether a particular individual is behaving, at a given juncture, as a
scientist can be determined by the mental processes underlying
his/her actions and words’’ [32, p. 121].
What we are saying is that probabilistic expressions can take the
form of both numbers and words. The most important evidential
test in law, that of relevance, depends on the tendency of an evi-
dence item to make a proposition more or less probable. Probabi-
listic judgments by participants of the legal process, whether on
relevance, degree of persuasion or aspects of forensic expertise, and
whether numerical or verbal, have a quantitative connotation. The
role of numbers is to substantiate comparisons. Hence, DECDs
decidedly fall short of the point. What matters, though, is the way
they miss the point. As outlined above, the proposed verbal de-
scriptors are not inherently useful or useless. The insurmountable
problem is, we think, that these six descriptors do not really
describe anything insofar as they lack grammar. They are void of
rules or standards of usage despite their ad-hoc description given in
Table 1 [in Ref. [45]]: anyone’s take on ‘‘persuasive’’ or ‘‘conceiv-
able’’ will be as (in-)valid as anyone else’s.44 Criteria of conformity
and completeness are structural properties (see also [6, p. 29e37]),
they cannot be subsumed within surface features of explanation as
suggested by the DECDs framework.42 See Section 2.4 for further references on qualitative probabilistic reasoning.
43 The interested reader can find more discussion on numbers in [5, 59].
44 Note that this also affects other forensic value of evidence scales [67] proposed,
for example, in [68, 80].
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A new expression, ‘digital transformation’, has become fash-
ionable and is currently circulating in forensic science. It is associ-
ated with forensic science encountering novel forms of evidence,
especially digital evidence. It is argued that such evidence implies
distinct challenges. For example, Horsman mentions ‘‘the nature of
digital evidence and investigations of this type’’ [p. 3], in particular
‘‘intricacies of digital data’’ [p. 1], as reasons why ‘‘a scientific
mechanism for quantifying digital evidence may not actually be
feasible’’ [p. 3]. He also argues that ‘‘attempts to quantify any un-
certainty should be abandoned’’ [p. 1]. As shown throughout the
present paper, this viewpoint is wide of themark, andmisconceives
the notion of probability on several fundamental aspects. The dis-
cussion in this section seeks to summarise two main points and
place them in awider perspective. This will lead to conclusions that
depict an alternative view on what the pending challenges in
(digital) forensic science are.
The first argument advanced here is that the scientific measure
of uncertainty, probability, is a liberal and flexible concept that can
be conceptualised in largely untechnical terms.45 Challenges arise,
even enthusiastic supporters of probabilism do not deny, when
applying probability. That is, when eliciting a person’s probability
regarding an event about which the person is uncertain. But the
crucial point here is that an applicational challenge is not detri-
mental to the logic of the method. As lawyers know all toowell, and
they have stressed repeatedly, the fact that the world is a compli-
cated place is neither a problem nor the fault of the method [e.g.,
37]. The limits lie with their user and, indeed, ‘‘any theory that
could not in principle represent the complexity surrounding us
would have limited value’’ [38, p. 288]. Also, it should go without
saying that conceptual frameworks do not work in a void. On the
contrary, they need to be placed into context through supporting
argument [54]. What these observations show us is that the pri-
mary problem does not necessarily rely with the forensic substance
matter, that is (digital) evidence, however intricate it may be.
Instead, the prospect of progress in digital forensic science critically
hinges upon the (commitment to the) proper understanding of
primary concepts related to the nature, purpose and use of formal
methods of reasoning applied to the assessment of probative value.
From a historical perspective, this is not a novel conclusion. Already
decades ago, it has been noted that ‘‘no science is without some
mathematical background, however meager’’ [56, p. 435], yet in
forensic science, ‘‘[m]ost, if not all, of the amateurish efforts of all of
us to justify our own evidence interpretations have been deficient
in mathematical exactness and philosophical understanding’’ [56,
p. 436]. What this means for digital forensic science is potentially
far-reaching: as a currently developing new branch of forensic
science, it has a unique opportunity not to commit the failures and
shortcomings in evidence interpretation that (continue to) affect
traditional forensic disciplines. However, this would require the
community of researchers and practitioners to draw suitable con-
clusions from the principles of forensic interpretation that have
been developed since the middle of the last century. The DECD
conclusion scale that replicates an inferentially problematic design
seen previously in forensic science (exposed here in Section 4),
along with critiques levelled against probability also seen else-
where in literature, are not conducive of such a perspective.
The second strain of argument, related to the above, calls for
clarity on the purpose and the properties of primary concepts, in
particular forensic interpretation and evaluative reporting as45 The particular conceptual device introduced in Section 2.2 requires little more
than thinking in terms of proportions.opposed to, for example, investigation (see also [76]). From a
methodological point of view, an analytical method is needed
because, firstly, probative value is not an intrinsic property of an
item of evidence that somehow exists independently of a human
interpreter, and, secondly, the purpose of interpretation at the
evaluative stage is to try to work out and assign meaning. The
concept of Digital Evidence Certainty Descriptors (DECDs) falls
short of this; as its name reveals, it is essentially descriptive.
Though this is not to say that one cannot be descriptive using
analytical concepts, which includes probability as a scientific
measure of uncertainty; we simply want to stress that this is not
what Horsman promotes. As mentioned above, he argues to the
contrary, i.e. that ‘‘attempts to quantify any uncertainty should be
abandoned’’ [p. 1]. This is an opinion to which one may be entitled,
but it is worthwhile for the readership to understand what the
wholesale rejection of methods for the quantification of uncer-
tainty, in particular probability, means e from a scientific
perspective. The explanation of this requires a brief detour into the
history of science. According to Cohen, science saw a ‘‘probabilizing
revolution” [22, p. 324] at the beginning of the twentieth century. It
involved developments in physics, chemistry and life sciences, such
as genetics. The probabilizing revolution, in this context, designates
the common thread among these science disciplines (including the
social sciences) that consisted of the introduction of ‘‘a set of the-
ories and explanations that were based on probability’’ [22, p. 96].
This was about a hundred years ago. Science has evolved since then
with probability now being an integral and natural part of it, a fact
that most contemporary commentators would not even consider
necessary to emphasise. Thus, by calling for an abandonment of
attempts to quantify uncertainty, Horsman suggests that the
mindset of (digital) forensic scientists is to be equipped with less
than what the state of science was a century ago.
How can a forensic branch get this far? In our view, a recurrently
invoked pattern of argument to avoid engagement with primary
concepts is claiming exceptional status. It has already been
observed elsewhere before in forensic science and we also see it
nowadays occurring in the context of digital forensic evidence. The
claim, however, that digital forensic science is inherently different
from other forensic branches that abide by scientific principles does
not meet the normative requirements, both methodological and
procedural in nature, which forensic fields ought to fulfill. A set of
descriptors that lack an underpinning conceptual frameworkwhich
could regulate usage in practice is sidestepping the requirement for
justification. A lack of accountability represents a loss, as it removes
justifications and reasoning processes entirely from the public
arena. If this is what (digital) forensic science is or aims at, then it is
difficult to see how it can meaningfully serve the needs of fact-
finders in the pursuit of justice.
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